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This paper analyzes the di⁄erence between foreign and domestic ownership of ￿rms with
respect to productivity. The analysis is performed using a panel of ￿rm data from Statis-
tics Sweden, covering the entire manufacturing sector in the 1990￿ s. First we show that,
other things equal, foreign-owned ￿rms have higher labor productivity as well as total fac-
tor productivity than domestic ￿rms. We also ￿nd that Swedish multinational ￿rms are as
productive as foreign-owned ￿rms. Then we show that the rate of growth in productivity is
higher in foreign-owned ￿rms. We ￿nd no evidence for reverse causality.
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11 Introduction
The ￿ ow of inward Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) to Sweden has increased dramatically
during the 1990s, mainly in terms of foreign acquisitions of domestic ￿rms and to a less extent
green￿eld operations. Before 1991, the situation was the reverse, inward FDI was sparse and
much smaller than the FDI out￿ ows (see Figure 1). The number of foreign-owned ￿rms in Swedish
manufacturing with at least 50 employees increased from 346 in 1990, to 528 in 2000 (see Table
1 or Tables 11 and 12 for regional and sectoral distribution). An overwhelming majority of these
￿rms became foreign-owned through acquisition of a domestic ￿rm.1 The decline in the total
number of ￿rms with at least 50 employees was the result of the deep recession during the 1990s.
The e⁄ects of FDI are important from a policy perspective. Can Sweden bene￿t from an
increasing in￿ ow of investments, or are the e⁄ects on the economy negative? In the popular
debate concerning foreign acquisition of domestic ￿rms (as opposed to green￿eld investments) the
negative aspects have often been emphasized.2 Foreign acquisition (or mergers) may imply loss
of national control and sometimes outsourcing of the domestic production to other countries. On
the other hand, foreign acquisition may also contribute to a higher productivity in the acquired
￿rm (see Norb￿ck & Persson (2001))3 and to knowledge spillovers to domestic ￿rms.4
The questions we seek answers to in this paper are: Are foreign-owned ￿rms in Sweden on
average more productive than purely domestic Swedish ￿rms? If foreign-owned ￿rms also di⁄er
in other respects from domestic ￿rms, can this explain the di⁄erence? Is productivity growth,
other things given, higher in foreign-owned ￿rms? Does superiority of foreign-owned ￿rms hold
even after controlling for selection bias?
A number of studies on the plant and ￿rm level indicate that there are di⁄erences between
multinational and purely local ￿rms. For the US, Doms & Jensen (1998) found that workers at
1Firms ￿rms with less than 50 employees were sampled before 1996. The number of accumulated ￿rms in Table
1 is thus likely to underestimate the true numbers.
2The consequences of increased inward FDI were intensively debated in the middle of the 1990s. The main
concerns emanated from Swedish business leaders who feared that the developments would increase market con-
centration and that outsourcing of domestic production to other countries would increase dramatically. In reports
from the ITPS (2004) and ISA (2003), it was shown that during the recession in the 1990s high-skilled production
was not outsourced from Sweden to other countries and that di⁄erences in behaviour between foreign and Swedish
companies during the recession in the 1990s was small.
3Norb￿ck & Persson (2002) show that a liberal policy against cross-border M&As is optimal when domestic
assets are su¢ ciently scarce. The domestic assets are expected to be more e¢ ciently used when they are transferred
from domestic to foreign ownership.
4Increased productivity, as measured, could be due to a more e¢ cient use of available input in foreign-owned
￿rms than in domestically-owned ￿rms. However the "increase" in productivity could also be due to higher product
prices if the foreign ￿rms use their superiority to increase their price cost margin (PCM) on a speci￿c product.
This e⁄ect may not be fully neutralized by de￿ ating output by the producer price index (PPI) since PPI is seldom
available at the product level, but rather at the industry level.
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Table 1: The number and share of foreign-owned ￿rms in the sample
Foreign All Ratio Foreign
Year owned ￿rms percent green￿elds
1990 346 2020 17.1% 74
1992 339 1761 20.6% 83
1994 363 1656 20.5% 70
1996 416 1804 23.1% 79
1998 486 1928 25.2% 105
2000 528 1938 27.2% 116
Source: Statistics Sweden and authors￿calculation. The sample consists of ￿rms with at least 50 employees in the
manufacturing sector. Foreign green￿elds is a subsample of foreign-owned ￿rms.
foreign-owned manufacturing plants (MNF:s) generate about 50 percent more value added and
receive 20 percent higher wages than employees at the average domestically-owned plant.5 Aitken
et al. (1996) found similar results for a number of developing countries. ModØn (1998) found that
foreign-owned ￿rms in Sweden are more productive and use more capital intensive technologies
than do domestic ￿rms. For the UK, Gri¢ th and Simpson (2001) found that the level of labor
productivity as well as the rate of growth of labor productivity was higher in foreign-owned ￿rms
as compared to domestic ￿rms in manufacturing.6 Also for the UK, Criscuolo and Martin (2003)
5Doms and Jensen (1998) made a distinction between US local ￿rms and US MNFs. They found that US MNFs
were more productive than foreign MNFs and that US local ￿rms were least productive.
6Gri¢ th and Simpson (2001) found that only establishments that were always foreign-owned had signi￿cantly
higher labor productivity. Furthermore, the di⁄erence in productivity was explained by di⁄erences in levels of
investments per employee.
3found that UK MNFs are less productive than US-owned plants, but as productive as non-US
foreign-owned plants.
We believe that many of the owner-speci￿c advantages proposed by John Dunning￿ s Owner-
ship, Location, Internalization (OLI) framework, such as higher quality, more e¢ cient production,
better marketing or stronger brand name in MNFs, will be re￿ ected in the key variables we study,
namely labor productivity (Lpr), measured as value added, de￿ ated by the industry producer
price index (PPI), per employee, or alternatively total factor productivity (TFP), computed as
the ratio of de￿ ated sales value to an index of input volumes. For instance, higher quality or a
fashionable brand name should be re￿ ected in higher prices relative to the industry average (i.e.
the PPI) and thus higher productivity as measured. However, a positive relationship between
foreign ownership and productivity may also exist because of reverse causality, i.e., if foreign
investors select high performance ￿rms as acquisition targets. To control for this selection bias
we consider the ￿rms￿productivity before acquisition and by using the instrumental variables
approach. Another method used to control for the selection bias, which we use in this paper, is
to control for not only the productivity level but also the productivity growth.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the theoretical con-
siderations. First, we discuss the international trade theory on the motives behind FDIs. We
then continue with a theory behind acquisitions in general, advanced by Lichtenberg & Siegel
(1987), according to which a low level of productivity will induce a change in ownership. This
theory contradicts the reverse causality hypothesis. In the next section, section 3 we present the
characteristics of our longitudinal ￿rm level data and econometric issues. The methods used and
empirical ￿ndings are outlined in section 4, while section 5 summarizes.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Motives for FDI
Caves (1974) argued that FDI should in￿ uence the host country conditions in at least two ways:
by technology transfers, and by increased competition. That transfer of knowledge to a¢ liates
should occur is of course also a central tenet in the traditional OLI paradigm, according to which,
in order to overcome the obvious handicap of having less information about how to operate in
7Alternatively one may use propensity score matching and di⁄erence in di⁄erence approaches. See e.g. G￿rg
& Girma (2003). This methodology will be used in a companion paper on Swedish ￿rm level data in progress.
4a foreign country, the Multinational Firm (MNF) has to be in possession of some owner-speci￿c
advantage such as a better product, more e¢ cient production and/or marketing skills, or an
established brand name (Dunning (1977), Markusen & Venables (1998)). If an MNF transfers
such knowledge to its a¢ liate, e.g. management or technological skills, this should enhance the
productivity in the ￿rm.
These e⁄ects are sometimes referred to as the direct e⁄ects of increased inward FDI, whereas
the indirect e⁄ects are externalities such as spillovers from the foreign a¢ liates to domestic ￿rms
(see e.g. G￿rg and Greenaway (2001) for a survey of the spillover literature). A basic question,
central for the relevance of spillovers, however, is whether it can be shown that the foreign-owned
￿rms really are superior in some respect to the purely domestic ￿rms, since otherwise there would
not seem to be much scope for spillovers whatsoever.
To further elaborate on the motive behind FDI:s the Dunning￿ s (1993) taxonomy of broad
motives is often used. They include the resource-seeking (when a natural resource is scarce in the
home country), market-seeking (e.g. when the home market is to small), e¢ ciency-seeking (when
some products can be more e¢ ciently produced abroad) and strategic asset-seeking motives. The
strategic asset motive would be particularly important in oligopolistic markets with rival ￿rms
preempting competitors gaining any advantage. The reduction of institutional barriers, such
as trade and FDI restrictions over the past two decades has simpli￿ed cross border investments
dramatically. Foreign acquisitions constitute more than 80% of all foreign-owned ￿rms in Sweden
during the 1990s (Table 1). This development can be explained by both the motives of e¢ ciency-
seeking and the market-seeking motives.
While the theories of multinational ￿rms suggest that foreign-owned ￿rms should be more
productive per se, there are theories explaining why ownership changes in general (not necessarily
foreign takeovers) should increase the e¢ ciency in the acquired ￿rms. Lichtenberg and Siegel
(1987) actually contradict the popular view of reverse causality of the acquirers￿superiority.
They extend the job matching theory of Jovanovic (1987) and test the validity of their theory
on US plant level data. The matching theory focuses on the quality of the match between the
owner and the plant/￿rm. The theoretical implications of the matching theory of ￿rm turnover
are that ￿rms with a low level of productivity are more likely to be acquired than ￿rms with
a high productivity and that the new owner will either raise the productivity or, if it is a poor
match, divest the acquired ￿rm. This theory thus contradicts the reverse causality explanation
5of foreign-owned ￿rms￿superiority, i.e. that MNFs tend to acquire domestic ￿rms with initially
high productivity.
2.2 De￿nition and measurement of productivity
When comparing productivity in foreign and domestic ￿rms we use both labor productivity and
total factor productivity. Labor productivity is only a partial measure of the ￿rm performance
and is used as a complement to our other measure of e¢ ciency, total factor productivity. This
will make it possible to compare our results with the results of studies that use labor productivity.
Moreover, the use of both labor productivity and total factor productivity will enable us to check
the robustness of our results.8
Assume that the production function of the ￿rm is a generalized Cobb-Douglas where output







it ￿ = ￿U + ￿S + ￿K ￿ 1 (1)
where Qit;Ait;Uit;Sit;Kit is output (value added), total factor productivity, inputs of unskilled
labor, skilled labor and capital, in the i:th ￿rm in period t, and ￿ is an indicator of returns to
scale, where ￿ > 0 indicates increasing returns to scale. The parameters are the same for all
















where sit;kit;are skill- and capital intensity and L is supposed to capture scale e⁄ects. The
total factor productivity, or e¢ ciency, of the of the i:th ￿rm in period t (Ait) is assumed to be
proportional to the stock of ￿rm-speci￿c knowledge. Such knowledge may come from di⁄erent
sources internal or external to the ￿rm, such as R&D expenditure of the ￿rm itself, learning by
doing or knowledge spillovers from various sources, domestic or international, where the latter
may follow input-output or trade links. One particular link for international spillovers may go
8The optimal combination of capital and labor di⁄ers among ￿rms and industries, see e.g. Coelli et al. (1998,
pp. 87). Therefore TFP is the theoretically most relevant concept. However, McGuckin and Nguyen (1993) argue
in favor of labor productivity. The reason is that inputs such as capital and energy often su⁄er from measurement
errors as opposed to data on output and labor.
9For simplicity we assume Cobb Douglas production technology in the derivations. The calculation of the
TFP measure in the Appendix, and the empirical analysis where we use the TFP measure, is based on a translog
production function technology, which by de￿nition equals the Cobb Douglas only if a number of conditions are
ful￿lled.
6from a foreign MNF to its a¢ liates in the host country. Let us write productivity as a function






On the sources of knowledge coming from learning (￿L
it) and spillovers in general, domestic and
international (￿S
it), we have no information, and thus we have to assume that these components
of knowledge are the same for all ￿rms.10 We do have information on R&D expenditures and
whether the ￿rm is foreign-owned (￿R&D
it ;￿FDI
it ). In the next section we consider how this
information can be linked to productivity.
2.3 Determinants of labor productivity
Since sit + uit = 1 (share of skilled- and unskilled employees) in equation 2 we only include one
of these shares. We add industry, ￿j; and time, ￿t; dummy variables and specify:
lnqit = Ait + ￿1 lnkit + ￿2 lnsit + ￿3 lnLit + ￿j + ￿t + "it (4)
Firm size, Lit is measured as employment of the i :th ￿rm. 11
By substituting R&D expenditures and foreign ownership for Ait in equation 4 we estimate,
lnqit = (￿4Rit￿￿ + ￿5Fit + ￿6FitRit￿￿)
| {z }
Ait
+￿1 lnkit + ￿2 lnsit +
￿3 lnLit + ￿j + ￿t + "it (5)
where Rit￿￿ is ￿rm i0s R&D expenditures in period t￿￿ and Fit is a dummy variable for foreign
ownership (Fit = 1 for foreign-owned ￿rms). The interaction term is added to allow for the
fact that the productivity e⁄ect of the (local) R&D expenditure of a foreign-owned ￿rm could
be di⁄erent from that of the R&D of a domestic ￿rm. 12
10For a formal discussion of how R&D and TFP can be related see Gri¢ th et al. (2000). Griliches and
Lichtenberg (1984) and Aghion & Howitt (1992) use endogenous growth models to formulate the connection
between R&D and economic growth.
11The e⁄ect captured by the F dummy should re￿ ect superior technology but could also be due to foreigners
having better better access to foreign markets, etc. resulting in higher productivity (with constant technology).
12Fors (1998) ￿nds that overseas R&D is mainly conducted to adapt technology and processes to local market
conditions. He also ￿nds that in industries that are relatively more specialized, the overseas R&D can serve as a
channel for the ￿rm to gain access to knowledge in ￿ centers of excellence￿ .
72.4 Determinants of total factor productivity
We calculate the TFP of the ith ￿rm in year t as the di⁄erence between the output and a
weighted index of the inputs, according to:
lnAit = lnYit ￿ !St lnSit ￿ !Ut lnUit ￿ !Mt lnMit
￿!Bt lnBit ￿ !It lnIit (6)
where Yit;Sit;Uit;Mit;Bit;Iit are de￿ ated sales, employment of skilled and unskilled workers,
the de￿ ated capital stock separated into machinery and buildings, and inputs of raw materials,
energy and semi-processed goods, and the !￿ s are the T￿rnqvist weights calculated by relative
cost shares (details on the TFP calculations are provided in the Appendix).
As discussed above, total factor productivity Ait may be expected to depend on the stock
of ￿rm-speci￿c knowledge. To estimate the importance of foreign ownership on total factor
productivity, we run regressions on an indicator of foreign ownership and a set of control variables.
Since the capital stock and the skill intensity are re￿ ected in the calculated TFP these variables
are not included in the right hand of the regressions. Thus we estimate
lnAit = ￿0 + ￿1Rit￿T + ￿2Fit + ￿3 lnLit + ￿4FitRit￿￿ + ￿j + ￿t + ￿it (7)
2.5 On the measurement of ￿rm-speci￿c knowledge stocks
One possible approach would be to calculate knowledge stocks by cumulating R&D expenditure
over time, with deduction for depreciation, i.e., knowledge becoming obsolete (see Hall & Mairesse
(1995)), but the available time series are too short for that. Thus we have to use the ￿ ow of R&D,
i.e., R&D expenditure as a proxy for the stock of ￿rm-speci￿c knowledge. The lag re￿ ects the
fact that making new knowledge operative may take time; we experiment with di⁄erent values of
￿. Whether it would be better to use R&D intensities instead of absolute expenditures is open to
discussion. Our approach is to use R&D expenditure. This corresponds to the theoretical case
where each ￿rm, whatever its size, produces one single product, and a given amount of R&D
expenditure results in a given improvement of the quality of the product or the e¢ ciency with
which it is produced, irrespective of the size of the ￿rm (Hansson & Lundberg (1995)).
83 Data and econometric issues
3.1 Data
Our analysis of di⁄erences in productivity is based on a sample from the FIEF longitudinal
￿rm level data base. The sample consists of Swedish manufacturing ￿rms during the period
1990-2000. The Statistics Sweden industry codes (SNI) were changed in 1992 (SNI92), which
made it di¢ cult to use data for the period before 1990 (SNI69). For the years 1990-1992 the
industry classi￿cation codes for each ￿rm were reported in both SNI69 and SNI92. Each ￿rm
reports information on nationality of ownership and has a unique identi￿cation number. The
data, supplied by Statistics Sweden, include all manufacturing ￿rms in Sweden with at least 50
employees because variables such as energy costs are not available for smaller ￿rms. In Table 2
we show that the ￿rms in the sample account for 77.5 percent of employment and 82 percent of
total value added in the manufacturing industry in 1997. Two di⁄erent data bases have been
matched, the ￿nancial statistics with information by ￿rm on sales and various inputs in the
production and the regional labor market statistics (RAMS) containing detailed information on
the educational level of workers by ￿rm. Each ￿rm has also been assigned a four-digit industry
code (according to SNI92).
Foreign ownership is de￿ned in the statistics as the case where a foreign ￿rm has a controlling
position in a Swedish ￿rm, which in turn is de￿ned as possessing 50% or more of the votes (not
necessarily equal to 50% of the shares, since Swedish ￿rms may - and do - issue shares with
widely di⁄erent voting power).13 Obviously the issue of foreign control is not so simple that it
can be completely described by a binary variable switching from 0 to 1 at a certain level of voting
power, here 50%, since - depending on the ownership structure - a share of the votes much lower
than that may be su¢ cient to give a high degree of control.
It should be noted that almost two out of three ￿rms in our sample report zero R&D ex-
penditure, which means that taking logarithms of the R&D variable - whether as intensity or in
absolute terms - drastically reduces the sample size. In the estimations presented below the R&D
variable is included without taking logarithms, in order to preserve the sample size. As a check
of robustness we also use the log of R&D. We use disaggregated producer price indices (PPI)
to de￿ ate value added and sales. The producer price index used for the manufacturing sector
13The advantages of using this de￿nition is further discussed in e.g. the concept paper on the de￿nition of
investment: WTO (2002). Other studies use di⁄erent de￿nitions of ownership. Gri¢ th and Simpson (2001) de￿ne
a holding of at least 20% of the votes as an e⁄ective voice in the the foreign enterprise.
9Table 2: Employment and value added for the sample and for total manufacturing sector 1997
Item Sample Total population Percent covered
Employment 531,241 685,382 77.5%
Firms 1979 51427 4%
Value added (billions of SEK) 289.27 353.51 82%
Value added per plant (billions of SEK) 0.16 0.01 ...
Employment per plant 290.1 13.3 ...
Notes: The population sample values are derived from the FIEF database and the totals from NV19 SM 0201
(SCB). The manufacturing sector covers SNI92 industries 15-36. The sample is truncated at 50 employees.
is at the 4-digit level. The service sector was excluded since we lack appropriate price indices.
The R&D expenditures is de￿ ated by an aggregated PPI index. Intermediate goods, buildings,
machinery and energy are de￿ ated by their appropriate and speci￿c disaggregated producer price
indices.
3.2 Econometric issues
In the process of estimating the role of foreign ownership for productivity, a number of econo-
metric problems have to be addressed. We expect that the presence of unobserved in￿ uences
(e.g. ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects) may a⁄ect the results. Another important aspect is the possible
endogeneity of the ownership dummy (selection bias) and the R&D variable, foreign investors
may select ￿rms with an above average productivity and R&D stock. There is also scope for
heteroskedasticity as well as serial correlation. For the OLS estimates the heteroskedasticity-
robust t statistics or alternatively time di⁄erenced variables with the Prais Winsten estimator
may be used. Both the within-￿rm (within group) estimator and ￿rst di⁄erencing eliminate
unobserved time invariant e⁄ects. The within-￿rm estimator is more e¢ cient if serial correla-
tion is not present.14 We follow Gri¢ th and Simpson (2001) using a two-step procedure (see
Hsiao, 1986) to analyze potential productivity di⁄erences between foreign and domestic ￿rms
when the nationality is constant. We highlight the potential problem with endogeneity by using
a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Davidson and MacKinnon (1993)).
14Traditionally time invariant omitted variables are solved for by using the within ￿rm (group) estimator directly
or by ￿rst di⁄erencing; but the RHS varible is a dummy (F), so within ￿rm; (yit ￿ ￿ yi) = (Fit ￿ ￿ Fi)￿ +("it ￿￿ "it) =
fit￿ + vit; where 0 ￿ Fi ￿ 1 is higher the longer the ￿rm is foreign-owned. For all ￿rms that do not change
ownership, all fit = 0; for ￿rms shifting to foreign-owned, fit shifts from a negative to a positive value, at
the time of shift; fit is then constant, but its level depends on the time of the shift. For ￿rst di⁄erencing;
M yit =M Fit+ M "it: In this case M Fit = 0 except for the shift year (M Fit = 1).
10In this paper, instead of di⁄erencing the equations 5 and 7 w.r.t time, we set up a slightly
di⁄erent equation, addressing a di⁄erent question: Do foreign ￿rms show a higher rate of pro-
ductivity growth, controlling for R&D expenditures, size of the ￿rms, industry and common time
trends. 15
￿lnAit = ￿0 lnAit￿1 + ￿1
Rit
Yit




where ￿lnAit = lnAit ￿ lnAit￿1;￿Rit ￿ Rit
Yit ;￿lnLit = lnLit ￿ lnLit￿1: Across manufacturing
sectors or regions, productivity levels in domestic ￿rms may exhibit ￿ conditional ￿-convergence￿ .
Firms with low initial productivity levels will then exhibit the fastest rates of growth in produc-
tivity. A ￿rm behind the industry frontier is expected to either exit or increase its productivity
due to increased competition from all other ￿rms, whether foreign or domestic. Firms lagging
behind can also be expected to bene￿t from knowledge spillovers in general and thus increase
their productivity, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). We control for possible productivity
convergence e⁄ects by means of lagged total factor productivity.
4 Results
4.1 Mean values
We start by answering the question whether foreign-owned ￿rms, on average, are more pro-
ductive than domestic ￿rms. Table 3 shows di⁄erences in mean values between domestic and
foreign-owned ￿rms across all manufacturing ￿rms during the whole period. By subtracting un-
weighted averages for the foreign ￿rms from the corresponding variables of the domestic ￿rms
for each variable it seems clear that foreign-owned ￿rms have on average higher labor produc-
tivity - measured as value added, de￿ ated by the industry producer price index, per employee
- than domestic ￿rms. At the same time, foreign ￿rms are also more human capital intensive -
measured by the proportion of employees with more than secondary education - as well as more
physical capital intensive (de￿ned as the stock of capital, measured by book value machinery and
buildings, per employee). Foreign ￿rms are larger, in terms of number of employees, older and
pay higher wages to both low-skilled (not in table) and high-skilled employees. Foreign ￿rms also
15Griliches and Licthenberg (1984) suggest that the R&D intensity (instead of expenditures) re￿ ect the changes
in the stock of R&D capital. For the US they ￿nd a positive relationship between an industry￿ s productivity
growth and its R&D intensity.
11Table 3: Similarity of mean values 1990-2000
Mean values
Variables Domestic Foreign Mean di⁄erence t-statistic










0.13 0.17 -25.64% -22.00
R&D intensities 0.017 0.018 -4.78% -0.09
ln(employment) 4.86 5.22 -7.34% -22.60
age 11.10 12.81 -15.00% 12.14
ln(wageHigh) 7.91 8.67 -10.00% -31.40
Export intensity 0.08 0.17 -113.00% -28.97
Market share 0.04 0.07 -55.80% -13.05
Note: The unweighted averages of each variable for the foreign-owned ￿rms are subtracted from that of the
domestic ￿rms. The t-statistics for these mean di⁄erences are also reported where the hypothesis is Ho: mean(0)
- mean(1) = di⁄ = 0 and the alternative Ha: di⁄ 6= 0.
have much larger export (measured by export intensity) and market shares than their domestic
counterparts. Turning to R&D intensity, the di⁄erence between domestic and foreign ￿rms is
not signi￿cant.16
4.2 The role of foreign ownership for productivity
We now turn to the next question: are the foreign-owned ￿rms more productive, even after con-
trolling for factors that may in￿ uence the results. Table 4 shows the regression parameters, esti-
mated by OLS, of Equation 5 explaining the variation across ￿rms and over time in the logarithm
of labor productivity, lnqit. Since test indicates heteroskedasticity, the heteroskedasticity-robust
t statistics are reported.
In column (2) we have included a dummy for domestically-owned ￿rms with multinational
activity in order to isolate the potential importance of international activity per se, as di⁄erent
from nationality.
Note that in all regressions in Table 4, industry and time dummy variables are included, as
speci￿ed in Equation 5.
Clearly higher skill- and capital intensity as well as R&D expenditure increases labor pro-
ductivity.17 Experiments with di⁄erent lags for the R&D variable do not change the results
16T-tests on R&D expenditures, instead of R&D intensities, and the shares of wages to high-skilled, instead of
absolute wages to high-skilled, gives similar results.
17The Hausman ￿
2 test reveals no endogeneity in Tables 4 and 5. The Breusch and Pagan LM test indicates
12Table 4: Determinants of labor productivity in Swedish manufacturing.
Dependent variable: lnLpr (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.07







0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11





0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
(12.32)*** (13.34)*** (13.34)*** (8.57)***
R&D expenditures (t-1) 0.80 7.89E-08 8.38E-08 0.02
(3.59)*** (3.53)*** (3.36)*** (4.35)***
[R&D][foreign](t-1) -1.80E-08 -0.94E-2
(-0.46) (-1.98)**
log(size) 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.70E-2
(0.50) (2.05)** (2.04)** (0.76)
No.obs 19964 15759 15759 15759 7701
Sw. MNF premium -over 0.02
foreign-owned ￿rms (F-test) (0.03)**
Hausman (DWH) ￿2 2.39
(0.12)
R2 0.27 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36
[Industry][foreign](F-test) 15.87***
Note: OLS estimations heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parenthesis, *** ; ** ; * signi￿cant at the one-,
￿ve- and ten percent level. In column (2) we add Swedish MNFs. A F-test of the linear combination of di⁄erence
between foreign-owned ￿rms and Swedish MNFs concludes that the labor productivity is higher in Swedish MNFs.
In column (3) we report the estimates from Equation 5. In column (4) we test the hypothesis that R&D in
foreign-owned ￿rms is less important. In column. (5) we estimate Equation 5 using the log of R&D. Unreported
time and four-digit industry dummies is always included.
much. While the variable R&D expenditure is positive and signi￿cant, the R&D intensity (not
reported), i.e. R&D as a share of value added or gross production cost, is not. Our interpretation
is that this supports the picture of each ￿rm - irrespective of size - producing one single product,
the quality improvement of which depends on the absolute amount of R&D spending and not on
the intensity; this stresses the role of R&D as a ￿xed cost (see Hansson & Lundberg (1995)).
In all regressions in Table 4, the foreign ownership variable is positive and strongly signi￿cant.
Thus our results indicate that - other things being equal - foreign-owned ￿rms have a productivity
omitted time invariant e⁄ects (￿xed or random) and thus that a panel estimator is appropriate. The Hausman
test for random e⁄ects indicates that the ￿xed e⁄ect estimator should be preferred.
13advantage over domestic ￿rms in general.
Table 4 has also been estimated by using robust regressions (not reported) where outliers are
down-weighted. The previous results are robust with respect to possible e⁄ects of outliers.
In column 2 we have separated Swedish multinational from local domestic ￿rms. Since we
lack explicit information on the status of being a local versus an multinational Swedish ￿rm we
use a proxy. When a ￿rm reports any export to a foreign a¢ liate we consider it a multinational
￿rm, otherwise a local domestic ￿rm. The results show that both Swedish multinationals and
a¢ liates to foreign MNFs show higher productivity (other things equal) than purely local - non-
MNF - domestic ￿rms, so: to be international is important, not nationality per se. A F-test
of the linear combination of a potential Swedish MNF premium over foreign-owned ￿rms (from
the coe¢ cients in column 2) indicates that labor productivity is higher in Swedish MNFs than
in purely local domestic ￿rms. When comparing Swedish multinational ￿rms to domestic local
￿rms in column (2) in Table 4 the premium for being a Swedish multinational is 7% higher labor
productivity.
Another result is that the e⁄ect on labor productivity of a given increase in R&D seems to
be less in foreign-owned ￿rms than in domestic ￿rms, since the interaction variable of R&D with
ownership is insigni￿cant in column (4) and negative and signi￿cant in column (5). A possible
interpretation could be that e¢ ciency and product quality of foreign a¢ liates in Sweden are
more dependent on the R&D e⁄orts of the parent company in the home market than on their
own R&D.
In column (5) we use the log of R&D as a check of robustness. If we exclude all ￿rms not
reporting any R&D activity, the productivity advantage of foreign ownership increases; it still
holds that the marginal e⁄ect of R&D is lower in foreign-owned ￿rms. About 1/3 of the sample
￿rms report R&D expenditures.18 The magnitude of foreign ownership premium, as compared
to domestic ￿rms productivity, increases but the size variable becomes insigni￿cant.19 Foreign
￿rms that report R&D expenditures have signi￿cantly higher labor productivity than domestic
￿rms with R&D expenditure, but on the margin the e⁄ect of more R&D expenditures is negative
in foreign ￿rms.
18As a further check of robustness (not reported) we have taken advantage of the whole sample by inputing a
small number for ￿rms reporting zero R&D. The results are qualitatively the same as the results in column (5) in
Table 4 and 5 for the ownership dummy. The only di⁄erence is that the R&D expenditures become insigni￿cant
in the TFP regressions.
19Di⁄erent measures of size, e.g. the employment normalized on mean industry employment, do not a⁄ect the
signi￿cance or magnitudes of the parameter estimates.
14Table 5: Determinants of total factor productivity in Swedish manufacturing.
Dependent variable: lnTFP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.11
(3.24)*** (5.37)*** (2.76)*** (2.75)*** (3.09)***
Swedish multinationals 0.05
(6.12)***
R&D expenditures (t-1) 0.60E-8 6.00E-08 6.05E-08 0.82E-2
(4.09)*** (4.07)*** (3.36)*** (2.35)**
[R&D][foreign](t-1) -2.13E-09 -0.01
(-0.08) (-2.64)***
log(size) -0.07 -0.50E-2 -0.01 0.21E-2
(-6.87)*** (-1.66)* (-1.66)* (0.34)
No observations 18636 15462 15462 15462 7681
Sw. MNF premium -over 0.36E-2
foreign-owned ￿rms (F-test) (0.46)
Hausman (DWH) ￿2 4.05
(0.04)**
R2 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.85
[Industry][foreign](F-test) 8.04***
Note: OLS estimations. heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics in parenthesis, *** ; ** ; * signi￿cant at the one-,
￿ve- and ten percent level. In column (2) we add a variable for Swedish MNFs. A F-test of the linear combination
of di⁄erence between foreign-owned ￿rms and Swedish MNFs rejects the hypothesis of a Swedish MNF premium.
In column (3) we report the estimates from eq. 5. In column (4) we test the hypothesis that R&D in foreign-owned
￿rms is less important. In column (5) we estimate Equation 5 using the log of R&D. The OLS estimates reports
heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics. Unreported time and four-digit SNI92 industry dummies is always included.
The potential for transfer of knowledge from a foreign MNF to its Swedish a¢ liates, and
therefore the productivity e⁄ect of foreign ownership, might be di⁄erent in di⁄erent industries.
To explore this possibility we computed a set of interaction variables as the product of the foreign
ownership dummy and the industry dummy.
Hit = ￿jFit
where ￿j is the industry 4-digit code. The interaction variable has been added to the equation in
column (3) in Tables 4 and 5. The null hypothesis ￿that the coe¢ cients of the whole set of these
variables are jointly zero ￿is rejected, which means that the e⁄ect of foreign ownership on labor
productivity is not the same for all industries. A possible interpretation is that the extent of ￿rm-
speci￿c advantages ￿superior technical or commercial know-how ￿of the MNFs, to local ￿rms, is
more important in some industries than in others. Table 5 shows the e⁄ects of foreign ownership
15directly on the calculated TFP of the ￿rm, corresponding to Ait in Equation 7. From the OLS
results in Table 5 it is evident that the previous results with regard to ownership premium in
labor productivity estimations (4) are robust. Controlling for ￿rm and industry characteristics
a⁄ecting productivity, foreign-owned ￿rms seem to have a productivity edge over domestic ￿rms.
This result is quite stable and does not depend on the measurement of productivity (labor
productivity or TFP) nor on the measurement of other variables or the estimation technique.
Again, when comparing ￿rms with R&D expenditures in column 5 the magnitude of foreign
ownership is stronger when taking the log of R&D expenditures.
4.3 The role of initial productivity for acquisition by a foreign MNF
If foreign investors select domestic ￿rms with an above-average productivity, our main conclusions
so far could be wrong. The causal interpretation and the validity of the results depend on the
direction of the e⁄ects. We use the instrumental variable approach to perform a Durbin Wu
Hausman (DWH) test of endogeneity, Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). From Table 3 it was
evident that foreign-owned ￿rms are older and larger. By using ￿rm age, size (squared) and
regional dummies, we instrument for foreign ownership.
The probit model allows estimations of the dichotomous (0-1 left hand variable) foreign own-
ership. The estimated errors from the probits is used in the DWH tests. In the ￿rst two columns
in Table 6 we show the probit estimates of the reduced form equations for the (endogenous) ex-
planatory variable "foreign ownership", based on Equation 5 and 7 respectively. The estimated
coe¢ cients for the instruments age and the region dummy is strongly signi￿cant according to
the z-values and the F-tests in column (1) and (2). The DWH tests cannot reject the null, i.e.
that foreign ownership is exogenous.
An alternative methodology is to estimate the probability of being taken over by foreign
owners during the period 1990-2000. For this we select the within-sample 385 foreign takeovers
during the period and ￿rms that were always domestically owned. Girma and G￿rg (2003) use
age and age square, size and size square to test the hypothesis that these trajectories in￿ uence
the probability of being acquired by a foreign owner. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) estimate
ownership changes on US plant level data using ￿rm size (log of employment) and initial produc-
tivity. McGuckin & Nguyen (1993) estimate a function similar to Licthenberg and Siegel on US
￿rm data but also include small ￿rms and allow for non-linearities and employment normalized
16by industry. They ￿nd, in contrast to Lichtenberg and Siegel, that initial productivity indeed
a⁄ects the probability of a ￿rm being acquired. Criscuolo and Martin (2003), for the UK did
however ￿nd evidence that the US advantage in the UK lies in the ability to take over already
productive plants.
Table 6: Determinants of foreign ownership and foreign acquisitions













ln(size) 0.17 0.17 0.12(t￿2)
(9.62)*** (10.42)*** (2.25)**












Region dummy F = 1308.61 F= 1338.95 F=1571.44
Log likelihood -5627.25 -5738.58 -843.39
Number of observations 13793 14036 5853
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.30 0.22
Note: Dependent variable in column (1) and (2) is the reduced form predictions used to instrument for the foreign
ownership dummy. Instruments are age, size square and a region dummy. In column (3) the dependent variable
is the acquisition year. z-values within parenthesis. Unreported time and industry (four digit SNI92) is always
included. In column (3) we test the hypothesis that foreign ￿rms acquire domestic ￿rms with above average
relative productivity, market share and exports.
We test the hypothesis that important determinants of ￿rm acquisitions are the educational-
and capital status in the ￿rm as well as ￿rm size, age, market share, industry and the region
within which the ￿rm operates. The level of R&D expenditures does not di⁄er between foreign
and domestic ￿rms according to Table 3 and we expect R&D expenditures to have little (if any)
impact on the probability of being acquired.
17According to the matching theory of Licthenberg and Siegel, ￿rms with a low level of pro-
ductivity are more likely to be acquired than ￿rms with a high productivity and thus we should
expect a negative relation between initial productivity and the probability of being acquired.
From Table 6 (column 3) it is evident that historical values of capital intensity, ln(size) (in terms
of the absolute number of employees) positively a⁄ects the probability of being acquired by a
foreign investor. Relative total factor productivity, R&D expenditure and market share have, on
the other hand, no e⁄ect on the probability of being acquired, while relative labor productivity
negatively e⁄ects the probability of being acquired.20
These results also con￿rm the results from a similar study of foreign acquisitions in Swedish
manufacturing during the period 1985-1994 by ModØn (1998). ModØn concluded that acquired
￿rms were not of a higher than average productivity type (in terms of both labor- and total
factor productivity) and that the incidence of being acquired was not dependent upon the R&D
spending.
4.4 The e⁄ects of ownership on the rate of growth of productivity
Since we found no evidence of reverse causality, we expect the rate of growth in productivity to be
higher in foreign-owned ￿rms. In Table 7 given R&D and controlling for time and industry e⁄ects,
foreign-owned ￿rms have a higher rate of growth in both labor and total factor productivity than
domestic ￿rms.
Lagged productivity is negatively related to the growth in productivity. The results thus give
strong support for the hypothesis of ￿-convergence in labor productivity as well as total factor
productivity.21
A higher rate of growth in capital intensity and a higher R&D intensity increases the rate of
growth in labor productivity, while the rate of change in skill intensity has no signi￿cant e⁄ect.
Larger ￿rms have slower rate of growth as compared to smaller ￿rms. When standardizing by
industry (in column (2) and (4)) the magnitude and signi￿cance of foreign ownership weakens,
but remains signi￿cant at the 10% level.
20Not reported, but with very similar results, are separate estimates with labor productivity, and total factor
productivity. Furthermore estimates with relative productivity de￿ned at di⁄erent industry aggregations gave
qualitatively the same results.
21To deal with serial correlation due to the lagged dependent variable (among others), and panel heteroskedas-
ticity in Table 7, we use panel corrected standard errors (PCSE￿ s). Though not reported, the corrected estimates
are even more signi￿cant than the reported estimates.
18Table 7: Determinants for the growth in productivity in Swedish manufacturing.













R&D intensities t￿2 0.85E-2 0.87E-2 0.40E-2 0.38E-2
(2.27)** (2.41)** (2.90)*** (2.67)***
4ln(size) -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06
(-1.76)* (-1.21) (-4.70)*** (-4.84)***
Foreign 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.80E-2
(5.10)*** (3.50)*** (3.29)** (1.78)*
lnLpr t￿1 -0.24 -0.36
(-9.97)*** (-12.3)***
lnTFP t￿1 -0.05 -0.19
(-8.21)*** (-13.17)***
Number of observations 12715 12715 12472 12472
Industry (four-digit) No Yes*** No Yes***
R2 0.14 0.24 0.28 0.36
Note: Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected t-values in parenthesis. Unreported time dum-
mies is always included. *** ; ** ; * signi￿cant at the one-, ￿ve- and ten percent level. We use lagged productivity
in levels as a measure of convergence.
4.5 Mode of entry
The previous results indicate that there is indeed a productivity premium for multinational
￿rms. As was evident in Table 1 the foreign green￿elds in Sweden constitute only 20 percent
of all foreign ￿rms. Could it be that the green￿eld operations are the most productive and
dominantly drive the previous results? Caves (1982) analyze di⁄erent entry modes. Green￿eld
operations are expected to be more risky than takeovers, due to the lack of information on the
new market. Svensson (1996) suggests on the other hand, that a new venture, as opposed to
an acquisition, can be tailor-made to ￿t the existing organization in the parent company. In an
acquired ￿rm, the existing assets have to be adapted to the interests of the parent, which may
be di¢ cult (especially for small ￿rms). The acquisition price will then be high and the expected
rate of return low.
In a study by ModØn et al. (2004) for Poland it was found that foreign green￿elds have the
highest labor productivity while foreign privatizations show the largest productivity increase.
19Table 8: Di⁄erences in productivity by mode of foreign entry.
lnLpr lnTFP
Dependent variables:. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign. green￿elds 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.07
(2.20)** (4.49)*** (3.16)*** (4.77)***
Foreign other 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04
(1.69)* (5.44*** (1.94)** (4.54)***














R&D (t-1) 0.79E-9 0.80E-09 0.60E-9 0.60E-09
(3.54)*** (3.60)*** (4.09) *** (4.11)***
log(size) 0.01 0.26E-2 -0.57E-2 -0.01
(2.06)** (0.51) (-1.63) (-3.01)***
Number of observations 15759 15759 15462 15462
R2 0.36 0.36 0.83 0.83
Note: Estimates of Equations 5 and 7. Huber-White corrected t-values in parenthesis. *** ; ** ; * signi￿cant
at the one-, ￿ve- and ten percent level. Unreported time and four-digit industry dummies is always included. In
columns (1) & (2) the dependent variable is log real value added per employee. In columns (3) & (4) the dependent
variable is log total factor productivity.
We can separate foreign green￿elds from foreign acquisitions in our data. To investigate the
relative importance of foreign green￿elds, we reestimate Equation 5 and Equation 7 where we
di⁄erentiate foreign-owned ￿rms by mode of entry.
We performed several tests of linear combinations based on the results from Table 8.The tests
indicate that there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence between green￿elds and other foreign-owned ￿rms
w.r.t labor productivity. There is a di⁄erence, though, between green￿eld and other modes of
foreign entry in the total factor productivity estimations in column (3) and (4), i.e. green￿elds
operations have higher total factor productivity than acquired ￿rms. Finally, when comparing
foreign green￿elds and Swedish multinationals we ￿nd no signi￿cant di⁄erence w.r.t labor or
total factor productivity
204.6 Within-￿rm estimates
We assume ￿rm speci￿c heterogeneity and its necessary to control for unobservables, e.g. the
quality of the labor and capital. In order to eliminate unobserved ￿rm e⁄ects due to a ￿rm-
speci￿c variable that vary across ￿rms but not over time, Gri¢ th & Simpson (2001) use a two
step method suggested by Hsiao (1986). In the ￿rst stage the within ￿rm-estimator is applied on
the productivity equations using only ￿rms with constant nationality that we observe ￿ve or more
times. In the next step the predicted (and then by calculating the mean over time) residuals
^ ￿i + ^ eit are regressed on the foreign ownership dummy Fit using OLS. For ￿rms that change
Table 9: Within ￿rm estimates
















R&D Expenditures 0.13E-8 0.63E-9 0.89E-9 0.61E-9
(9.96)*** (4.17)*** (7.89)*** (4.95***
ln( size) -0.89E-2 -0.10 0.21E-2 -0.09
(-0.76) (-7.07)*** (0.19) (-7.37)***
age 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09
(15.97)*** (40.42)*** (14.19)*** (44.01)***
age2 -0.32E-2 -0.75E-4 -0.22E-3 -0.56E-4
(-5.77)*** (-1.14) (-4.08)*** (-0.91)
Number of observations 12566 12212 16965 16162
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within ￿rm estimates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Second stage estimates:
Dependent variable ^ ￿i + ^ eit ^ ￿i + ^ eit
Foreign 0.03 0.09
(2.49)** (2.22)**
Number of observations 1819 1825
Note: In column (1) & (2) the two step procedure is applied on ￿rms with constant nationality. In the top half of
the table the within estimator is applied on lnLpr and lnTFP. In the next step the residuals are regressed on the
foreign ownership dummy by using OLS. In column (3) & (4) the within estimator is applied on ￿rms changing
nationality and domestic ￿rms with constant nationality.
21nationality we apply the within ￿rm estimator directly. We have estimated speci￿cations similar
to those of Gri¢ th & Simpson as complements to Equations 5 and 7, in Table 9. Following Gri¢ th
& Simpson and adding age and age square variable to 5 and 7 we reduce some of the predicted
residuals from the ￿rst step. In contrast to Gri¢ th and Simpson we also include domestic ￿rms
with constant nationality when we estimate the within estimator on ￿rms changing nationality
in order to compare ￿rms that become foreign with those that remain domestic in Table 9.
When we consider unobservable di⁄erences in ￿rms with constant nationality, again, a higher
capital intensity increases labor productivity, but skill intensity is now negatively related to
labor productivity. One possible explanation could be a pro-cyclical pattern in skill intensity;
if ￿rms are more likely to reduce blue collar (than white collar) workers during recessions, we
will observe a negative relation between skill intensity and labor productivity. The coe¢ cients
for the ownership premium are higher both in terms of labor and total factor productivity, as
compared to previous OLS results in Table 4 and 5. For the group of ￿rms that change nationality,
we consider the same variables as for the ￿rms that had constant nationality. The ownership
dummy now illustrates the di⁄erence in the level of productivity in ￿rms that change nationality
as compared to domestic ￿rms with constant nationality and ￿rms that became domestically-
owned during the period. The results suggest that ￿rms changing nationality have a higher level
of productivity after the ownership change, as compared to ￿rms that were always (or became)
domestic.
5 Conclusion
The study uses data for all ￿rms in the Swedish manufacturing industry with more than 50
employees for the period 1990-2000, a period during which foreign ownership increased strongly.
It was found that the variation in labor productivity across Swedish manufacturing ￿rms is
explained by di⁄erences in capital intensity, skill intensity and R&D-activity. Given the values
of the control variables, however, productivity is also a⁄ected by ownership. On average, foreign
￿rms seem to have a 2 to 7 percent productivity advantage over domestic ￿rms. The same results
hold when productivity is measured by total factor productivity.
Another ￿nding is that the e⁄ect on productivity of a given increase in R&D seems to be
lower in foreign-owned ￿rms, presumably because the R&D of the foreign-owned ￿rms may be of
a di⁄erent kind, e.g. mainly for adapting products of the parent MNF to a national market. By
22using the reduced form predictions to perform a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, we ￿nd no evidence
for endogeneity of the ownership variable. Moreover, the probability for a domestic ￿rm of being
acquired by a foreign MNF does not depend on its initial relative productivity (but on ￿rm
capital intensity and size). Another result is that the rate of growth in labor and total factor
productivity is shown to be higher in foreign-owned ￿rms. By controlling for unobservables,
the within-￿rm estimates suggest that the estimated foreign ownership premium in ￿rms with
constant nationality is 3% and 9% respectively for labor and total factor productivity, and 0.5%
and 5% for ￿rms changing nationality. We also conclude that the di⁄erence between foreign and
domestic ￿rms varies between di⁄erent sectors. Given these results there should, for example,
be scope for positive e⁄ects of foreign presence on the productivity of domestic ￿rms through
various channels including knowledge spillovers.
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276 Appendix
6.1 Total factor productivity
Gunnarsson and Mellander (2001) provide evidence on the importance of using disaggregated
data when constructing a productivity measurement. We assume that de￿ ated sales value, Y ,
is produced using four factors of production; capital K, skilled labor S, unskilled labor U, and
intermediate goods M. We assume a general production function
Yit = AitF(Kit;Sit;Uit;Mit)
where Ait is a Hicks neutral e¢ ciency parameter measuring total factor productivity. As a ￿rst
step in constructing a total factor productivity index one has to choose a functional form. The
Cobb-Douglas production function assumes that all inputs are substitutes, whereas the Translog
allows for complementarity between inputs. We use the Divisia T￿rnqvist index in order calculate
changes in the input mix.22 This index is based on a Translog production function. We calculate






lnTFPt = lnYt ￿ lnXt
similarly, the growth in TFP:
4lnTFPt = 4lnYt ￿ 4lnXt
An important assumption in the calculations is that time is continuos. The majority of economic
data is however not continuous and therefore a discrete approximation is often used, e.g. the
Divisia index. In the T￿rnqvist (1936) index the weights used to aggregate the inputs are simply











22This index ful￿lls important properties such as invariance and independence, se e.g. Diewert ([9], [10]).
23Harper, Berndt & Wood [23], Gunnarsson och Mellander [18].
28We calculate rental prices for capital separately for machinery and buildings, see Gunnarsson &
Mellander (2001), Harper Berndt & Wood (1989), according to
PK;t = PI;t￿1
￿




where PK;t is rental price for capital, PI;t￿1is the appropriate investment price index, r is the
nominal long term interest rate, ￿ ￿K is the average rate of depreciation.
296.2 Tables
Table 10: Description of variables
Variable name Description
R&D De￿ ated R&D expenditure in SEK, from the Financial Statistics.
Lpr Value added, de￿ ated by the industry producer price index, per employee.
relTFPijt & Relative TFP & relative Lpr: Productivity of the ith ￿rm relative to average
relLprijt productivity, in industry j (four-digit) at time t.
export intensity Export as a share of total output.
K
L The de￿ ated book value stock of capital over total employment.
S
L The percentage share of employees with a post-secondary education.
market4share Sales in ￿rm i relative to total sales in the industry at the four digit level.
Y Sales.
size Firm size, measured as employment of the ith ￿rm.
industry dummy Industry dummies de￿ned at four-digit level.
Year Yearly time dummies.
F Takes the value 1 if ￿rm i is a foreign-owned ￿rm and 0 otherwise.
age Age of the ￿rm, truncated at 1973 (from the FIEF database).
region Local municipality (kommun) in Sweden (290 in total)
30Table 11: Foreign ownership. In percentage of total employment in each industry 1990 and 2000
SNI92 industry codes 1990 2000
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 19.5 30.0
16 Tobacco products 0 49.8
17 Textiles 14.8 23.6
18 Wearing apparel 1.1 13.9
19 Luggage, handbags and footwear 2.1 3.3
20 Wood and products of wood and cork 5.3 13.6
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 14.7 34.0
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction 4.2 10.2
23 Manufacture of coke and re￿ned petroleum 20.6 82.0
24 Chemicals, chemical products and man-made ￿bres 27.6 74.6
25 Rubber and plastic products 24.4 23.4
26 Non metallic mineral products 32.1 50.2
27 Basic metals 8.8 27.1
28 Fabricated metal products 13.8 9.9
29 Machinery and equipment 26.1 33.3
30 Electrical and optical equipment 38.3 20.4
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus 42.8 30.1
32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 27.8 17.4
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 23.6 32.1
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailers 6.2 50.6
35 Other transport equipment 6.6 22.5
36 Other manufacturing 12.7 10.1
Total manufacturing industry SNI92: 2 digit 15-36 16.9 27.5
Table 12: Foreign ownership in percent of total employment by county 1990 and 2000
Counties: 1990 2000
1 Stockholms l￿n 16.9 28.5
3 Uppsala l￿n 21.0 7.1
4 S￿dermanlands l￿n 25.2 21.4
5 ￿sterg￿tlands l￿n 30.7 28.6
6 J￿nk￿pings l￿n 10.4 16.8
7 Kronobergs l￿n 10.5 15.7
8 Kalmar l￿n 19.5 25.2
9 Gotlands l￿n 0 3.0
10 Blekinge l￿n 13.7 54.9
12 Sk￿ne l￿n 20.4 31.5
13 Hallands l￿n 16.7 20.8
14 V￿stra G￿talands l￿n 18.1 31.9
17 V￿rmlands l￿n 19.6 37.9
18 ￿rebro l￿n 18.6 27.9
19 V￿stmanlands l￿n 43.2 34.9
20 Dalarnas l￿n 6.5 36.9
21 G￿vleborgs l￿n 10.3 12.6
22 V￿sternorrlands l￿n 19.5 23.7
23 J￿mtlands l￿n 8.2 0.4
24 V￿sterbottens l￿n 12.1 9.8
25 Norrbottens l￿n 5.4 2.6
31